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ABSTRACT 
Abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of MSc in Banking and Finance. 
 
Credit Scoring and Bank Lending Policy in Consumer Loans 
By Maria Ganopoulou and Fotini Giapoutzi 
 
Consumer loan performance determines the profitability and stability of banks and other 
lending institutions and screening the loan applications is a key process in minimizing 
credit risk. Therefore, the primary problem of any lender is to differentiate between 
“low risk” and “high risk” debtors prior to granting credit. The main method used in 
assessing credit risks is the credit scoring analysis. The incentive of our research is the 
recent global financial crisis that erupted in September, 2008 which caused a dramatic 
reduction of loans granted by financial institutions. In this study a sample set of 
applications from a large Greek financial institution was focused on in order to estimate a 
credit scoring model for the consumer loans in Greece during the period 2007-2009.  
Taking into consideration that during a period of financial distress the banks‟ lending 
criteria change rapidly, we separated the full data into tree periods and estimated a 
probit model per year in order to examine the probability of granting a loan changes 
through years. Moreover, by constructing a bivariate probit model in order to avoid the 
sample selection effect, we analyzed how the borrower‟s characteristics influence the 
decision of granting consumer loans and their performance. Concisely, according to our 
empirical results, we verified that the probability as well as the criteria of granting a 
loan changes through years especially in periods of financial distress. Last but not least, 
we demonstrated that the financial institutions‟ lending policies are compatible with 
default risk minimization and thus it is important for banks in order to minimize default 
risk, to review the borrowers‟ creditworthiness periodically. 
 
Keywords: Credit Scoring, Greek Banks‟ Lending Policy, Financial Distress, 
Bivariate Probit
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Consumer credit is granted by banks, retailers and a variety of other lending institutions 
and is a sector of the economy that has seen rapid growth over the last 50 years. 
Furthermore, consumer credit constitutes a significant instrument in the financial 
planning of households. When current income falls below a household‟s permanent 
level and assets are not available, credit constitutes a means to increase their welfare 
and maintain consumption at a level which is consistent with permanent income. 
Despite the wide variety of banking services, lending to the public constitutes the core 
of the income of banks and other lending institutions. Traditional methods of credit risk 
evaluation incorporated the use of human judgment, based on experience of previous 
decisions to determine whether to grant credit to a borrower. The emergence of 
advanced computer technology and the economic pressures, resulting from the 
increased demand for credit, have led to expansion of sophisticated statistical models to 
support the credit granting decision. 
Credit scoring models may be used as a tool for underwriting and administering all kind 
of retail credit, including credit cards, direct and indirect installment loans, mortgages, 
and small business credit (OCC Bulletin, 1997). A variety of types of credit scoring 
models are used for various activities such as to control risk selection, to manage credit 
losses, to improve loan approval processing time, to assess new loan programs, and to 
ensure that existing credit criteria are reliable and consistent. 
 From a technical perspective, the lending process is a relatively straightforward series 
of actions involving two principal parties. These actions go from the initial loan 
application to the successful repayment of the loan or its default. Although retail lending 
is among the most profitable investments in lenders' asset portfolios, at least in 
developed countries, increases in the amount of loans also causes increases in the 
number of defaulted loans. Therefore, the primary problem of any lender is to 
differentiate between “low risk” and “high risk” debtors prior to granting credit. Credit 
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scoring is a statistical approach that predicts the probability that a credit applicant will 
default or become delinquent. Credit scoring is broadly applied in consumer lending. 
Primarily, the amounts lent are much smaller in the case of retail lending, and therefore 
from the risk management point of view, retail loans are dealt with using a portfolio 
approach. 
In the following section 1.2 it is represented how the recent global financial crisis in 
2008 motivated us to proceed with this particular research. 
 
1.2 Financial Distress and Banking Statistics 
 
The onset of the recent financial crisis that erupted in September, 2008 has thrown 
economies around the world into recession. The starting point of this crisis was sown in 
the credit boom that peaked in mid-2007, followed by the meltdown of business and 
consumer loans, mortgages and securitized products. The consequential concerns about 
the health of financial institutions became a complete banking panic following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, and government takeovers of 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG. Although the panic in U.S.A. subsided in the first 
half of October of 2008, the financial results in the Greek Banking and economic 
environment became observable in the balance sheets and financial statements of banks 
and companies at the end of 2009. 
During the financial distress in Greece a large number of banks has shown to be 
insufficiently attentive to risks within their portfolios. After a variety of government 
actions to promote the liquidity and solvency of the financial sector, prices across most 
asset classes and commodities fell drastically and the cost of corporate and bank 
borrowing rose substantially. The instructions of Bank of Greece, concerning the 
commercial and retail banking system, were to diminish their assets originating from 
loans and advances to customers.  Almost every bank in Greece in order to purge their 
finances reacted simultaneously the same way by decreasing dramatically the amount of 
loans granted. Evidently, this extraordinary policy of all banks involved that henceforth 
the criteria to grant a loan would be much more strict and consistent.  
Since the period under examination of our research includes the credit crunch, it would 
be of interest to see the progress of consumer loans in the Greek Banking sector through 
some evidential statistics. As we can notice, Table 1.1 presents a detailed picture of 
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credit extended to the Greek economy by domestic Monetary Financial Institutions 
excluding the Bank of Greece. At the end of 2007 the amount of loans granted was 
€31.915 millions whereas by the end of 2008 it reached the amount of €36.412 millions, 
which equals to a total increase of 14%. On the other hand, the amount of loans granted 
between the periods 2008-2009 decreased by 1% (from €36.412 million in 2008 to 
€36.023 in 2009). 
To the extent that X Bank
*
 is concerned, we observe from Table 1.2 that the percentage 
of change of the amounts granted reduced from 25,3% (period 2007-2008) to 2,5% 
(period 2008-2009). This is also an indicator that enhances the consequences of the 
financial crisis.  
Before proceeding with the objective of our research, it would be essential to explain in 
detail the procedure of submitting a consumer loan application in Greece and the 
characteristics of the loan. This procedure is described in the following section 1.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 We denote as X Bank the bank of our sample 
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Table1.2.1 Credit to domestic non-MFI residents by domestic 
MFIs excluding the Bank of Greece 
(outstanding amounts at end of period in EUR millions) 
  Dec-2007 Dec-2008 Dec-2009 
1  
GROSS DOMESTIC       
PRODUCT (GDP) at 
market prices 
 
226.437 239.141 237.494 
2 TOTAL CRETIT 246.540 280.998 294.787 
3 CONSUMER LOANS 31.915 36.412 36.023 
3.1 in Euros 31.908 36.402 36.014 
3.2 In non-euro currencies 7 11 8 
3.a Short-term Loans up to 1 
year 15.164 16.549 15.558 
3.b Middle-term Loans  over 1 
and up to 5 years 6.049 6.537 6.164 
3.c Long-term Loans over 5 
years 10.702 13.326 14.301 
3.i Credit Card Debt 9.275 10.044 9.538 
3.ii Other Consumer Loans 22.640 26.368 26.485 
 Total Debt of Households 
in Domestic banks 
(%GDP) 45,6 48,2 49,9 
Source: Bank of Greece 
 
 
 
Table 1.2.2 Consumer Loans of X Bank for the period 2007-2009 in Euro millions 
 31.12.2007 31.12.2008 31.12.2009 Δ% 
2007-
2008 
Δ %2008-
2009 
Consumer, Credit 
Cards and other Loans 
4.846.256 6.073.941 6.225.000 25,3% 2,5% 
Source: Annual Reports of X Bank at the end of 2007, 2008 and 2009 
* Mortgages are excluded from the table 
 
1.3   Procedure of consumer loan applications and the characteristics 
of the loan 
 
The starting point of every loan is the application. When lending institutions receive an 
application for a loan, the process by which it is evaluated and its degree of complexity 
may vary greatly. The purpose of this paper is to examine extensively the applications 
of a consumer loan of a Greek Bank during the period 2007-2009. The main 
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characteristics of this particular loan are its predetermined duration as well as its stable 
monthly installments. Moreover this product appeals both to already existent customers 
of the bank but also to new ones.  
To begin with, this personal consumer loan is an amortizing loan with exact expiration. 
The aim of this product is to service the needs of households under the assumption that 
the borrower is a natural entity and a permanent resident of Greece. The amount of the 
granted loan can range from €1.500 to €30.000 and its duration fluctuates between 6 to 
96 months. The interest rate which yields monthly remains stable for the whole loan 
duration. According to the transactional behavior of the customer, the bank may decide 
to diminish the interest rate. This case applies only if the borrower is performing well 
and has not defaulted.  Furthermore, there is a fixed charge for editing the applications 
of each customer which the bank receives when the loan is granted.  
The customer submits an application that is edited electronically by the bank‟s officer. 
Moreover, the applicant must submit to the bank all the available documents such as a 
copy of his/her identity card and a statement by the Internal Revenue Service referring 
to the last tax year.  Occasionally, the bank requires collateral for the loan. In this case 
the same documents are required for the guarantee as well. After the fulfillment of the 
application and the submission of all documents, the bank officer forwards the 
application to the Retail Banking Credit Management Department. After the collection 
of the applications, the Credit Management Department evaluates the applicants via 
credit scoring model and, at the same date, informs the branch about the approval or 
rejection of each application. There is also the possibility according to which the Credit 
Management Department communicates with the branch due to deficient or even wrong 
documents of the applicant. In this case the bank officer has to adjust or to correct the 
documents and re-forward the application to the qualified department. The last stepping-
stone is the notification of the applicant about the approval or rejection of his/her loan 
by the bank officer. 
As far as the payments of the installments are concerned, the bank offers various 
alternative ways to the borrowers in order to facilitate the repayment of the loan. Such 
ways include cash in hand in any branch of the bank, via a standing order linked to the 
customer‟s deposit account, via charge of credit card or via web banking.  
Finally, the bank gives the opportunity to the borrower to skip up to two installments 
per year as well as the option to rearrange the amount of payment by increasing or 
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decreasing the loan duration. The last two benefits are offered by the bank under the 
assumption that the loan is performing well. 
 
1.4 Objective 
 
In this paper we focus on an analysis of the determinants of obtaining a consumer loan 
as well as the probability of a loan to default in Greece for the period 2007-2009. It is 
also very important to refer that the period of our research includes the latest global 
financial distress that affected Greece too. Therefore it is worthwhile and interesting to 
see what is happening in the case of the Greek banking system. 
The intention of this research is firstly to examine if the criteria, which influence the 
decision of granting consumer loans, change through time. According to McAllister et 
al. (1994), it is necessary to review the borrowers‟ creditworthiness periodically as the 
changes in economic condition could affect the criteria on lending policy. We separate 
the full data into tree periods and estimate a probit model year to year. Taking for 
granted that, in periods of financial distress the financial decisions change rapidly, it is 
important to examine the financial institutions‟ reaction to their lending policy. 
Secondly, we construct and estimate a bivariate probit model in order to examine how 
the variables affect the probability of obtaining a loan and the probability of a good 
loan. We choose this model in order to avoid the sample selection effect that might 
arise. More specifically, a predictor of default risk in a given population of applicants 
might be systematically biased because this given population is not made by a random 
sample. In our research this population is constructed only by the applications that were 
being accepted and therefore it is important to take it into consideration (Greene, 1998). 
 Last of all, we explore if our results are in accordance with the strength of the finding 
that banks‟ lending policies are not consistent with default risk minimization (Boyes et 
al. 1989). In other words, we examine if the factors that affect positively (negatively) 
the probability of obtaining a loan, also affect positively (negatively) the probability of a 
good loan or not and we compare our results with the inferences of other studies with 
the same researching view. 
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1.5 Outline of thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the 
relevant literature and the background on credit scoring. The benefits and limitations of 
credit scoring are described in detail as well as the commonly variables used in these 
models. Moreover, we illustrate the modeling techniques used in other studies with 
similar researching view.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology, the sample data 
collection method and the estimation of the econometric model. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical results and discussion of the results generated by the analysis. Chapter 5 
summarizes the major findings followed by the limitation of the research and 
recommendations for future study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section of the thesis we examine the role of credit scoring and its contribution in 
the bank‟s lending decision and we exemplify the advantages and disadvantages of 
credit modelling. Following this, we proceed with a description of the most commonly 
variables used in credit scoring and finally we end up with the modelling techniques 
used in other studies with the same researching view. 
 
2.1 Banks’ lending decision 
 
Consumer loan performance determines the profitability and stability of the financial 
institutions and the key process in minimizing credit risk is to screen the loan 
applications. Before making any credit decisions, credit analysis should be completed as 
part of the screening process. Credit analysis, which consists of the valuation of the 
financial history and financial statements of the applicant credit background, aims to 
evaluate the borrower‟s probability of repayment, to determine the financial strength of 
the borrower, and to minimize the risk of non-payment to an acceptable level. Good 
borrowers with low credit risk would be granted a loan, while a high risk borrower 
would be denied. Credit analysis incorporates two major problems: the appraisal of all 
important factors about an applicant simultaneously and the evaluation of all applicants 
impartially. Quantitative and qualitative variables, which will be analyzed 
comprehensively in section 2.4, are used to assess loan applicators. Two main methods 
are used to estimate a borrower‟s creditworthiness (Crook, 1996): the loan officer 
subjective assessment known as judgmental technique and the credit scoring technique. 
Creditworthiness of an applicant is judged based on the characteristics that meet the 
requirements for a loan. In case of someone who is not creditworthy, he/she will be 
unqualified for the loan (Lewis, 1992). The judgmental technique of an applicant‟s 
creditworthiness is based on 6 C‟s namely Character, Capacity, Cash, Collateral, 
Conditions and Control (Rose, 1993) (see Table 2.1). Glassman et al. (1997) claim that 
judgmental technique of credit is inefficient, unexplainable, incompatible and non-
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standardized. Traditional methods of deciding   whether to grant a loan are based on 
experience of previous decisions and use human judgment of the risk default.  
However, the augmented demand for credit, associated with greater commercial 
competition and the emergence of new computer technology have led to the 
development of credit scoring technique. Credit scoring methods produce more precise 
classifications in comparison with subjective judgmental assessments by loan officers. 
Rosenberg et al. (1994) argue about the credit scoring method advantages over the 
judgmental technique. For instance, credit scoring is more efficient since it lets loan 
officer to focus only on ambiguous cases, and it also assists the lenders to review the 
borrowers‟ creditworthiness frequently. Therefore, credit scoring models is a preferable 
technique in credit risk assessment.  
In section 2.2 it is stated a comprehensive analysis of credit scoring and its use. The first 
one who used a statistical model to predict a borrower‟s probability to default was 
Altman (1968). His intention was to identify the borrower credit risk more objectively. 
Following this, many statistical credit scoring models have been developed, such as 
logistic regression, neural networks, smoothing nonparametric and expert systems and 
have been widely used in assessing credit risk (Hand et al., 1997). Following this, many 
statistical credit scoring models have been developed, such as logistic regression, 
discriminant analysis, linear probability method, probit model, and neural networks and 
have been widely used in assessing credit risk (Hand et al., 1997). The main 
characteristics of each of these techniques are going to be studied in section 2.5. 
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Table 2.1.1 The Six basic C’s in lending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wang W. (2010) 
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2.2 What is credit scoring? 
 
Credit scoring was firstly used by U.S. retailers and mail-order companies in the 1950‟s 
with the early application of investment portfolios in order to manage and diversify 
borrowers default risks (Thomas et al., 2002). Currently, the credit scoring models turn 
out to be one of the most successful techniques of modelling in banking and finance. 
Based on statistical analysis, credit scoring uses the borrowers‟ historical data and credit 
characteristics and the point of this method is to detach the effect of several 
characteristics of applicants on delinquencies and defaults. Credit scoring models can 
assist banks to make lending decisions. Credit scoring enhances and sometimes replaces 
the traditional subjective assessment, since it measures the credit risk of applicants 
much more accurately and quickly than the latter one. This method of measuring credit 
risk is mostly used in consumer loans, especially in credit cards but, nowadays, has 
become commonly used in mortgage lending as well. Furthermore, this scoring method 
has become applicable in complex business loans, because of the advanced computer 
technology which increases data accessibility for companies. Therefore, many banks are 
using credit scoring models to evaluate loan applicants, with the intention to make 
applicants‟ default risk more predictable.  Credit scoring system is a computerized 
process producing a score according to various relevant characteristics of the borrower, 
such as income, profession, age, wealth, previous loans, etc. The final score is obtained 
by summing the individual borrower‟s score. Credit will be granted if the score is higher 
than a predetermined bank‟s “cut-off-level”, otherwise the credit will be refused. The 
overall idea of credit scoring is based on the statistical probabilities, or in other words 
the combinations of the borrowers‟ characteristics differentiating good from bad. In 
such way a score is generated in order to act as an estimation of the risk level of each 
new. Crook (1996) argues that the goal of credit scoring is to predict risk, not to explain 
it. Thus, it is not necessary that the predictive model also explains why some borrowers 
default on the loan repayment and others do not. Credit scoring analyzes electronically 
the borrowers‟ credit history and other characteristics regarding repayment ability that 
are, in general, provided by borrowers. Based on previous experience with borrowers of 
similar loan profiles, credit models could predict the default risk of any loan granted. A 
successful credit model should give high scores to borrowers whose loans would 
perform well and low scores to borrowers whose loans would not perform well. A 
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fundamental procedure to develop a superior credit scoring model, is to review the 
borrowers‟ credit worthiness periodically, since changes in economic environment 
could affect loan performances. By and large, there is no best credit scoring models. It is 
probable that some bad borrowers may get a high score and receive the loans, and vice 
versa. Jesen (1992) argues that using credit scoring, almost 8 percent of the applications 
would be approved when they were actually bad loans and 18 percent of the 
applications would be rejected when they were good loans.  
Borrowers have the option to default, in any credit market. Those ones who default are 
not excluded from future borrowing, which means that there is free entry of lenders and 
borrowers and also lenders are not allowed to conspire to punish defaulters. Instead, the 
lender learns from an individual‟s borrowing and repayment behavior about his/her type 
and summarizes his/her reputation for not defaulting in a credit score. Limited 
information about the borrower‟s behavior and earnings realizations might have as a 
consequence lenders to grant limited credit or credit at higher interest rates following.  
 
2.3 Pros and cons of credit scoring 
 
Credit scoring has some obvious benefits compared to judgmental techniques for both 
lenders and borrowers which led to its increasing use in loan evaluation. Firstly, credit 
scoring models allow immediate handling of the explicit binary decisions. This leaves 
more time for credit officers to concentrate on the less clear-cut cases that are least well-
handled by the models. Credit scoring is also an efficient way to save time, since the 
loan granting time is reduced to days or hours instead of weeks for consumers. Credit 
officer can cope with more loan applications than in traditional loan assessment method. 
This time savings means cost savings to the bank and benefits to the customer as well. 
Specifically, customers have to provide only the information used in the scoring system, 
so applications can be less time consuming. Moreover, another significant advantage of 
credit scoring is that it reduces the probability for bias. This can be justified by the fact 
that credit scoring is a standard loan granting procedure. Bank officers apply the criteria 
assembled by the model and applicants are evaluated against these criteria. In 
comparing to the judgmental methods which are usually negatively biased towards bad 
borrowers, the scoring models take into consideration the characteristics of both good 
and bad borrowers.  The model assists lenders to ensure that the same underwriting 
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criteria have been applied to all borrowers regardless of gender, nationality or other 
factors prohibited by commercial law used in credit appraisal.  
As far as the classification of loans is concerned relatively to credit risk, the credit 
analysts can evaluate the riskiness of each borrower with reasonable degree of 
confidence and the cut-off level can be adjusted according to the risk of each loan 
portfolio. Thus credit scoring offers the ability to lenders to control risk levels. 
Apart from that, this computerized method allows bank officers to review the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers at regular intervals. As a result, risk monitoring of the 
individual borrower becomes simple. 
Last but not least, credit scoring has the advantage that it is based on historical data. 
This indicates that lenders can better predict the next applicant‟s probabilities of 
performing well or defaulting, due to the database and credit history recorded in the 
system. 
Even though credit scoring reduces costs and increases the efficiency to the loan 
granting process, the weaknesses of credit scoring should not be disregarded. 
To begin with, credit history scoring models offer the benefit of low-cost and reliable 
quick screening, and since these models are based only on data enclosed in credit 
reporting agency files, they can be used to monitor more or less any potential customer. 
However, because they are based on less information than that commonly used in 
consumer credit screening, they entail the probable disadvantage of being less precise 
than models based on a fuller set of data. Avery R.B. et al. (2004) examines the 
potential costs of failing to incorporate situational data into consumer credit evaluations 
and also discusses practical difficulties related with the development of credit scoring 
models that incorporate situational data. These complexities arise because of intrinsic 
limitations of the credit reporting agency databases used to build many scoring models. 
 
Accuracy is also a vital consideration in using credit scoring. The cost savings and other 
advantages of credit scoring could be negatively affected by loans which are not 
performing well if the models are not accurate. Credit scoring models are complicated; 
that means that the models are good only if the data are sufficient and accurate enough. 
Otherwise the model will generate imprecise results.  A sample of both well-performing 
and bad performing loans should be included in the data used in credit scoring. In order 
to ensure that changes in the relationship between potential factors and loan 
 [14] 
 
performance are captured, the data need to be reviewed regularly and the model should 
be re-estimated frequently. 
Another important characteristic of scoring models is that the borrowers‟ features are 
much correlated with their likelihood of repayment and defaults. Although credit 
models endeavor to forecast the probability of a borrower‟s default, there is no 
alternative for knowing the borrower. Often, credit scoring models incorporate human 
errors because credit scoring cannot replace the decisions of loan officers which are 
based on informal qualitative knowledge. Therefore, it is important for banks history in 
order to make a credit decision to deal with customers who have not had an immaculate 
credit and to combine this knowledge with credit scoring.  
An essential factor for a model to be accurate is to make predictions when the economy 
is either in recovery or in recession. Thus, the data used in the model should cover both 
good and bad economic periods.  
As it is already mentioned credit scoring models are used to predict the probability of 
default. However, the models, usually, use a sample of accepted applicants only. This 
selection bias could lead to bias estimation by credit scoring model. According to 
Schreiner (2003) to avoid the bias in credit scoring model, banks should apply the credit 
scoring model to loans that are already conditionally accepted by the credit officers. For 
instance, the First National Bank of Chicago, for small- business loans, rejected about 
25% of the applications by using credit modelling while the same applications were 
later approved by the credit officers. To conclude with, in order to avoid bias in credit 
scoring, the bank‟s credit evaluation can be a mixture of the traditional lending through 
credit scoring models.  
 
2.4 Variables commonly used in credit scoring 
 
Credit scoring entails that all characteristics and available information of the borrower 
that have obvious connections with default risk should be used in the model. The 
model‟s predictive accuracy is maximized if the variables are in sequence added or 
deleted (Henley et al., 1997). There are two important criteria for variable selection. 
Firstly, the variables should have significant coefficients and contribute to explanation 
of the dependent variable‟s variance. Secondly, the variables should have close 
correlation with variables included (Dinh et al., 2007). Lewis (1992) claims that there is 
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no need for justification of each variable. If it helps the predictions, it should be used. 
However, the main factors generally used in credit scoring models include the 
borrowers‟ personal characteristics such as income, age, gender, education, occupation, 
region, time at present address, residential status, marital status, and followed by the 
borrowers‟ banking relationship such as collateral value, loan duration, time with bank, 
number of loans, and current account (Dinh et al., 2007; Roszbach, 2004; Jacobson et 
al., 2003). 
Income denotes the borrower‟s annual income and is a commonly used proxy of the 
borrower‟s financial wealthy and his/her ability to repay (Dinh et al., 2007). Income and 
the borrowers‟ default rate are positively correlated since higher income is related with 
lower default risk (Jacobson et al., 2003). 
As far as occupation is concerned, this is a variable used in credit scoring which is 
greatly associated with income.  
Regarding education, it increases the borrowers‟ ability to repay. We can discriminate 
borrowers by their educational level as the better educated people are considered to 
have more stable and higher income employment and thus a lower probability of 
default. 
Employer signifies the type of company for which a borrower works such as stated-
owned, foreign, joint-stock company, etc. This variable is important for the reason that 
the type of the borrower‟s company could be a proxy for income level and stability. 
Missing values of this variable are also very enlightening since borrowers who do not 
answer this question show the highest default rates. 
The variable “time with employer” measures the number of years that the borrower has 
been working for the current employer. It displays the satisfaction of the borrower with 
the current job. The higher the borrowers‟ job satisfactions, the more stable their 
employment will be and the higher their ability to repay their loans (Cook et al., 1992). 
It should be emphasized that the length of time with employer may discriminate against 
women, since women‟s length of employment decreases due to pregnancy and 
childbearing.  
Age measures the borrower‟s age in years. Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. (1992) 
verify that older borrowers are more risk adverse, and consequently the less likely to 
default. Therefore banks are more cautious to lend to younger borrowers who are more 
risk averse. 
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Although gender is considered to be biased in many industrialized countries due to 
statistical rates of men versus women, there is plenty of evidence that women default 
less frequently on loans possibly because women are more risk adverse (Coval et al., 
2000). 
Region depicts the area of the country that borrower lives. A common proxy for this 
variable could be the postal code. As people of similar wealth are likely to live in the 
same location, the geographic criterion can imply a borrower‟s level of financial wealth. 
Some suburb might attract richer residents and this could lead to increase in real estate 
property prices. Moreover, this also influences the collateral value and probability of 
default. 
The residential status points out whether borrowers own their home, rent, or live with 
their parents. In the case of home ownership this variable could indicate the borrowers‟ 
financial wealth. In addition, residential status also signifies financial pressure on 
borrowers‟ income through insurance fees, taxes, or electricity costs. Crook et al. 
(1992), notice that borrowers living with their parents are less likely to default. 
„Time at present address” refers to the number of years the borrowers have been living 
at their current address. As stated by Crook et al. (1992), the default risk and the time at 
present address are negatively correlated, illustrating that it might be a proxy for the 
borrowers‟ maturity, stability, or risk aversion. Changing address might be a signal that 
a borrower‟s financial wealth is high or improving rapidly. 
Marital status has an impact on the borrower‟s level of responsibility, reliability, or 
maturity. Statistics show that default rates are higher for married than single borrowers. 
Dinh et al. (2007) demonstrated that the marital status is associated with the number of 
dependants which in turn replicates financial pressure on the borrower and borrower‟s 
ability to repay a loan. 
Collateral is a type of guarantee in order to minimize the borrowers‟ probabilities of 
default. In the retail loan sector, requiring collateral may be a signal of risk. For 
example, if the loans that the house serves as collateral, the probability of default is very 
low. This is due to the fact that the borrowers are risk adverse and fear of losing their 
house. The higher the collateral value the higher the incentive for the borrowers to repay 
the loan since they would avoid loosing their collateral. The collateral value could also 
be a proxy for the borrowers‟ financial wealth since it is significantly positive correlated 
with the borrowers‟ income (Dinh et al., 2007). 
 
 [17] 
 
Loan duration indicates the maturity of loans in months. This variable is an outcome of 
the negotiation between the bank and the borrower.  There is a probability that a 
borrower might be rejected for a shorter loan while he/she might be accepted for a 
longer one of the same size as the pressure on his/her income is decreased. Loan 
duration represents the borrowers‟ intention, risk aversion, or self-assessment of 
repayment ability. 
“Time with the bank” measures the length of the banking relationship in years. It can be 
assumed that the longer a borrower stays with the bank, the more the bank knows about 
this borrower, and the lower the default risk becomes. However, this variable should be 
revised regularly due to unexpected changes in the borrowers‟ situation. 
Number of loans counts the number of loans a borrower has received from the bank 
during the whole relationship with it. Many borrowers have a sequence of historical 
loans and quite often more than one loan from the same bank. This proxy is informative 
about the borrower‟s default risk because a borrower who has not met his/her pay off  
obligations to an already granted loan, will also have difficulties in receiving a new 
loan.  This variable, therefore, reflects the difficulty for a defaulted borrower to receive 
further loans from the same bank. 
Current account is a binary variable which reflects whether the borrower holds a current 
account with the bank. This variable is relevant and indicates up to some degree the 
borrowers‟ financial wealth, and relationship between the borrower and the bank. 
However, the borrowers who hold current accounts with their banks have a lower 
default risk.  
 
2.5 Modelling techniques of credit scoring  
 
The most common statistical methods used to estimate credit scoring models in 
assessing borrowers‟ credits, are discriminant analysis linear probability models probit 
models and logit models. The last three methods estimate the default rate based on the 
historical data on loan performances and the borrowers‟ characteristics. Traditional 
credit scoring methodology has focused on using techniques such as discriminant 
analysis and linear regression to distinguish between applicants who are assumed to 
belong to one of two classes, namely good and bad credit risks. Previous papers which 
include the application of these methods to credit scoring include Myers and Forgy 
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(1963), Eisenbeis (1978), and Reichert et al. (1983). However, according to Eisenbeis 
(1978) and Reichert et al. (1983) both these techniques are subject to the conceptual 
problems.  
In particular, the main purpose of discriminant analysis is to predict group membership 
based on a linear combination of the interval variables. The procedure begins with a set 
of observations where both group membership and the values of the interval variable are 
known. The end result of the procedure is a model that allows prediction of group 
membership when only the interval variables are known. Furthermore, a second purpose 
of the discriminant analysis is an understanding of the data set, as a careful examination 
of the prediction model that results from the procedure can give insight into the 
relationship between group membership and the variables used to predict group 
membership. 
According to Mester (1997) discriminant analysis divides borrowers into high and low 
default-risk classes. On the other hand, Hand et al. (1996) show that the discriminant 
function obtained by segmenting a multivariate normal distribution into two classes‟ 
optimal discriminant function. Altman et al. (1981) based on discriminant analysis, 
generates indices depending on whether or not the applicant belongs to the population 
of those who would be defaulters. However, as stated by Boyes et al. (1989), since the 
overall incentive of a lender is profit maximization, this view of Altman et al. (1981) 
may be misleading. 
In order to overcome this problem Boyes et al (1989) suggests the probit model which 
assumes that the probability of default follows the standard cumulative normal 
distribution function.  The goal of his research is to display how expected earnings on 
revolving credit loans rely both on probability of default and maintained balances. 
Boyes et al. (1989) and Jacobson et al. (2003), applying a bivariate probit model,  
provide evidence that by classifying applicants according to predicted default 
probabilities, banks can minimize the expected default rate but this does not solve the 
problem of profit or utility maximization. Tor Jacobson et al.(1998) investigate how 
banks provide loans in a way that is not consistent with default risk minimization and 
they concluded that the size of the loans does not affect the default risk. Banks are not 
faced with a trade-off between risk and return even if they are risk averse. It is also 
shown how estimating Value at Risk can enable banks to develop alternative lending 
strategies on the basis of their implied credit risks and loss rates 
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Regarding the linear probability model, it could present reasonable prediction results 
compared to discriminant analysis and logit models (Collins et al.1982).  The aim of 
linear probability is to search for a linear combination of explanatory variables. It 
assumes there is a linear relationship between the default rate and the factors. However, 
Pyndick et al. (1998), and Greene (1998), indicate that the linear probability model 
could predict the default rate, but the predictive value might not necessary lie between 
zero and one. Moreover, because the variance of the models is generally 
heteroscedasticity, it leads to inconsistent estimation problem. 
According to Henley et al. (1996), the logistic approach is a more appropriate statistical 
tool than linear regression, when there are two discrete classes (good and bad risks) 
defined in the model. This gives the logistic approach superior classification rate. In this 
type of models the probability of default is logistically distributed. Logistic Regression, 
which is very similar to the probit model, has been also applied with success by 
Wiginton (1980), Gilbert et al.(1990) and Leonard(1993). This method was first 
proposed by Chesser (1974) for forecasting commercial loan non-compliance. The 
report of Steenackers et al. (1989), which concentrated on the origin of a credit scoring 
model for personal loans, is also based on a logistic regression model. In particular, the 
assumption that is made is that the probability of a loan to be good is dependent on the 
level of the characteristics of each applicant. The two main questions answered by this 
report are firstly which characteristics are proper to be used in the credit scoring model 
as variables that can discriminate between a good and a bad loan, and secondly how to 
obtain the score for each characteristic. The logistic modelling approach is commonly 
used to model the bank‟s lending decision. According to Collins et al. (1982), the logit 
model can increase the overall classification rate, and substantially reduce the error rate. 
The logistic approach also gives superior classification compare to discriminant analysis 
(Wiginton, 1980).  
The paper of Henley et al.(1996) refers to the application of the k-nearest-neighbour (k-
NN) method a technique in pattern recognition and nonparametric statistics, to the credit 
scoring problem. More specifically, this paper denotes the problem of choosing a 
suitable technique for distinguishing between a population of good and bad credit risks. 
Assessment was made between the performance of the k-NN method and a range of 
other classification techniques. Logistic and linear regression and decision trees were 
selected to represent the accepted credit scoring techniques. It was found that k-NN 
method performed well, achieving the lowest expected bad risk rate. It was claimed that 
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a set with equal proportions of bad risks should be used to categorize future applicants 
regardless of the population bad risk rate. Furthermore, it was found that, given the 
power of technology, it is possible to classify an applicant within seconds and that k-NN 
method can provide reasons for turning down credit. 
Duration or survival analysis estimates not only if, but also when a loan will default. 
Such models provide us also information about the profitability of customers on a 
product since they can deal not just with default risk but also other events that may 
affect profit like early repayment of a loan. Survival analysis was first suggested by 
Narain B.et al. (1992) and has been evolved by Stepanova M. et al. (2001).  The report 
of Carling et al. (2001) analyzes the features that influence the time to maturity on 
consumer loans and develop a distribution of conditional expected durations of loans, 
representing how a loan application can be evaluated by calculating its expected 
earnings. The conversion of consumer loans from an active to a dormant status is 
examined and this transition is associated with the characteristics of the loan applicant. 
Last but not least, the expected return on each loan is calculated by using the predicted 
time to dormancy and it is compared with the revenue of a benchmark loan. Other 
examples of duration analysis are Kiefer (1988) and Diebold et al. (1990). 
Santos Silva J. M. C. et al. (2000) developed a model for credit scoring in order to 
estimate the default probabilities using a data set on personal loans granted by a Spanish 
bank. This model is based on the beta-binomial distribution. The first problem that is 
raised is the sample selection. In particular, it examines the decision to accept or refuse 
the credit applications using data on the borrowers that is not available to the formation 
of the credit scoring model. The second issue that this paper deals with is that the 
repayment behavior of a borrower may change after he is classified as defaulter. In most 
cases the bank compels the borrower to repay his debt, and that may modify the 
borrower‟s behavior. However, the results of this report should be judged with great 
caution since the data set used is relatively poor. 
According to the literature, there is no best method for estimating credit scoring models 
and new methods continue to evolve. Nevertheless, the intention of most of the models 
described above is to make a distinction between applicants who would repay from 
those who would default.  
The modelling technique used in our research was the bivariate probit model,  that is 
analyzed  more extensively in the following Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Question 
 
The intention of this research is to investigate the effects of the borrower‟s 
characteristics in the decision of granting consumer loans and in their performance. We 
use credit scoring model in order to examine the probability of obtaining a consumer 
loan as well as the probability of a loan to default in Greece for the period 2007 to 2009. 
The data sample consists of loan applications including the borrowers‟ characteristics 
(age, gender, annual income, marital status, nationality, region, type of residence), the 
loans‟ characteristics (loan duration, loan status, if there is a warrantor or not), and other 
variables indicating the relationship of the applicant with the bank (other banking 
transactions, other loans). 
In order to estimate credit scoring models, several statistical methods are used which are 
also named score cards or classifiers. These models apply predictor variables (otherwise 
characteristics) from application forms or other sources such as customer‟s credit 
history and customer‟s data, so as to attribute estimates of the probability of obtaining a 
loan and the probability of default (Hand et al. 1997). Methods of statistical models 
include discriminant analysis (Dunn at al. 1976), linear probability models (Turvey 
1991), probit models (Luftburrow at al. 1984) and logit models (Mortensen et al. 1988). 
The probit and logit models are widely used by a lot of researchers such as Wihinton 
(1980), Schwartz et al. (1990), Roszbach (2004), Chang S. et al. (1998), Games F. et al. 
(2000), Hayden (2003) and Huyen D.T. (2006). These two models differ in the 
distribution function. The first of the models uses the normal distribution function 
whereas the later the logistic one. This difference has as a consequence the logistic 
model to have slightly flatter tails than the probit model does.  According to Greene 
(2002), the two models‟ results are nearly identical. We use in our research the probit 
model. 
The purpose of this research is firstly to examine the probabilities that we have 
mentioned above and secondly to explore the strength of the finding that banks‟ lending 
policies are not consistent with default risk minimization (Boyes et al. 1989). According 
to Boyes‟ et al. (1989) study, if the financial institutions‟ lending policies are 
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compatible with default risk minimization one should find same signs for the parameter 
of one particular explanatory variable in the model of probability of obtaining a loan 
and in the model of probability of default. In other words the variables that increase the 
probability of a positive decision of taking a loan should also increase the possibility of 
failing to pay, or vice versa. But the results of his study and also the results of Roszbach 
(2004) and Jacobson (1998) prove the opposite. Specifically they found variables that 
bank uses to increase the likelihood of accepting the application and give the loan but 
also increase the risk of default (Roszbach 2004). 
Taking into account that the credit scoring model is intended to provide precise 
valuation of every applicant‟s probability of default, loan officers should assign loan 
obtaining criteria in order to maximize profitability (returns) and minimize the default 
risk. Therefore it is worthwhile to see what is happening in the special case of Greek 
banking system and subsequently relate our results to the general frame that surrounds 
this scope. It is also very important to refer that the period of our research includes the 
latest global financial distress which affected Greece too. Taking into consideration this 
parameter our results will be even more interesting and commendable. Considering 
these financial conditions, we will also try to find if the criteria that affect the 
probability of obtaining a loan in these years change year to year.  
 
3.2 Sample Data 
 
The research sample period is from 2007 to 2009. The data are obtained from a 
commercial bank of Greece, denoted in our analysis as X bank, for confidence reasons. 
All the applications that we received were submitted in stores (the X bank has branches 
across the country) where the potential borrowers applied for instant credit to fund the 
purchase of a consumer good. The total number of observations from the available data 
set is equal to 14738. 8095 Out of 14738 applications were accepted and 6643 were 
rejected. The data set also includes the status of the accepted applications (loan status) 
which is divided into two categories the “good” loans and the “bad” loans. The 
monitoring day that the loan status is referred is the 3
rd
 of August of 2010. The bank 
classifies as good loans the loans that are still active and the loans that have been 
completely taken up. The loans with more than 90 days payment delay are classified as 
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bad loans. In the data set 6752 of the accepted loans are good loans and 1343 are bad 
loans which is approximately 19.9% (default rate). 
The data set also includes the date that the potential customers submitted the 
application, applicants‟ characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, annual 
income, residence type, region, loan duration and some other information such as 
applicants‟ relationship with the bank.  
 
3.3 Description of Variables 
 
The variables that we used for our credit scoring model have common characteristics 
with the variables that Thomas (2000), Crook et al. (1992), Boyes et al. (1989), 
Roszbach (2004), Jacobson et al. (2003) , Dinh et al. (2007) and a lot of other 
researchers used in their studies. We used eleven variables in our research in order to 
assess the probability of obtaining a loan and the probability of default. These variables 
are the gender, age, annual income, other banking transactions, marital status, loan 
duration, postal code, nationality, residence type, underwriter and other loans. 
Age measures borrowers‟ age in years. We classify this variable into three categories: 
19-40 (young borrowers), 40-60 (middle-aged borrowers) and older than 60 years old 
(elderly). 
Gender is divided in female and male and even though some studies (Schreiner 2004) 
showed that this variable lose its effect when it is correlated with other factors, we 
include it in order to see if there is any influence in the probability of obtaining a loan 
and the probability of default. 
Marital status is the variable that indicates if the applicant is married, divorced or single. 
This variable shows how responsible, credible and mature one can be. Specifically, 
taking marital status into account we can observe how many dependants of the borrower 
there are and consequently how much the financial pressure is and what is borrower‟s 
ability to pay back his/her loan (Dinh et al.  2007). 
Income is the variable that defines the annual income of the applicant. This variable is 
divided it into two classes: annual income less than 15000 euro (low-middle income) 
and annual income more than 15000 euro (high income). It is obvious that the income 
indicates to a great extend the financial health of the borrower and his/her ability to be 
reliable to his/her loan installments. 
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Postal code specifies where the applicant lives. This variable is divided into two groups: 
borrowers that live in the two big cities (Athens, Thessaloniki) and borrowers that live 
in other cities of the country (Kavala, Drama, Patra, and so on). People that live in big 
cities tend to have more job opportunities but in the same time their spending and cost 
opportunities are also more. Thus we will try to clarify the ambiguous effect of this 
variable. 
Residence type declares whether the borrower lives in a house of his/her own (owner) or 
he/she is renting one (tenant) and this implies the borrower‟s financial wealth too. 
Nationality shows if the applicant is Greek or not (other) and we will investigate 
whether there are payment consistency differences between them. 
Banking transactions and other loans variables indicate the relationship of the applicant 
with the bank or other banks. Specifically the first variable shows if the borrower is 
already customer of the X bank or not whereas the second one specifies if he/she has 
other loans that should be paid. 
Underwriter gives financial support and takes responsibility for paying any costs 
associated with the activity he or she underwrites. This creates some sort of security in 
the payment of the loan and therefore we will investigate if it affects the decision of 
obtaining a loan. 
Loan duration measures the maturity of a loan in months. The specific consumer loan 
may have duration from 6-96 months. We categorize this variable into two groups: short 
term loans with duration less than or equal to 12 months and long term loans with 
duration more than 12 months. 
All the above variables have been classified into different groups for the purpose of our 
research. It is important to mention that one group of each variable will not appear in 
the results. This happens because one group of the variable is treated as the benchmark 
for the other groups. For instance, the gender variable is divided into two classes: 
female and male. These two groups will transform into two dummy variables (indicator 
variables) and take values zero or one to indicate the absence or presence respectively of 
the effect.  Consequently one of them must be omitted because otherwise their sum will 
be one resulting in perfect multicollinearity (dummy trap problem) (Suits 1957). 
More specifically applicant characteristics (dummy variables) include: 
 
AGE = Group1 (age1): 1 if the applicant‟s age is between 18 to 40 years old, 0 
otherwise 
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  Group2 (age2): 1 if the applicant‟s age is between 41-60 years old, 0 otherwise 
 Group3 (age3): 1 if the applicant‟s age is 61 or above, 0 otherwise 
GENDER = Group1 (male):1 if the applicant is male, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (female):1 if the applicant is female, 0 otherwise 
MARITAL STATUS = Group1 (married):1 if the applicant is married, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (divorced):1 if the applicant is divorced, 0 otherwise 
 Group3 (single): 1 if the applicant is single, 0 otherwise 
INCOME = Group1 (lowincome):1 if the applicant has annual income less than /or 
15000 euro, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (highincome):1 if the applicant has annual income more than 
15000euro, 0 otherwise 
POSTAL CODE = Group1 (bigcity):1 if the applicant lives in Athens or Thessaloniki, 0 
otherwise 
 Group2 (othercity):1 if the applicant lives in other cities of Greece, 0 otherwise 
RESIDENCE TYPE = Group1 (tenant):1 if the applicant is renting a house, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (owner):1 if the applicant owns a house, 0 otherwise 
NATIONALITY = Group1 (nationg):1 if the applicant is Greek, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (nation):1 if the applicant has other nationality, 0 otherwise 
BANKING TRANSACTION = Group1 (bankbus):1 if the applicant has other banking 
transactions with the bank, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (nobankbus):1 if the applicant has not other banking transactions with 
the bank, 0 otherwise 
OTHER LOANS = Group1 (wotherloans):1 if the applicant has other loans to pay, 0 
otherwise 
 Group2 (otherloans):1 if the applicant has not other loans to pay, 0 otherwise 
UNDERWRITER = Group1 (wunderwr):1 if the applicant has underwriter, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (underwr):1 if the applicant has not underwriter, 0 otherwise 
LOAN DURATION = Group1 (loandur1):1 if the applicant wants a shot term loan with 
duration less than/or 12 months, 0 otherwise 
 Group2 (loandur2):1 if the applicant wants a long term loan with duration more 
than 12 months, 0 otherwise 
The dependent variables are: 
LOAN STATUS1 (loanst) = 1 if the loan is accepted, 0 if the loan is rejected 
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LOAN STATUS2 (loanst2) = 1 if the loan is good/does not default, 0 if the loan is 
bad/default 
The general models of our research are the functions of the observed variables with the 
explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Econometric Model 
 
In the first model, as we mentioned above, we are interested in modelling the loan status 
of each individual in our sample which is whether one applicant obtains a loan or not. 
The applicants differ in age, marital status, race, income and other observable 
characteristics, which we denote as x. The goal is to quantify the relationship between 
the individual characteristics and the probability of obtaining a loan. 
Taking values of zero and one, the binary dependent variable y, makes the linear 
regression of y on x not suitable. The most important reason is that the implied model of 
the conditional mean puts inappropriate restrictions on the residual of the model. 
Moreover, the fitted value of y from a simple linear regression is not limited to lie 
between zero and one. Therefore we overcome the problems with the linear model by 
choosing binary choice models (otherwise named univariate dichotomous models) 
which are specifically constructed to model the „choice‟ between two discrete 
alternatives (Greene, Econometric Analysis,5th edition 2002).  
Suppose that we model the probability of observing a value of one as: 
 
 
 
F is a continuous, strictly increasing function that takes a real value and returns a value 
of ranging from zero to one. The choice of the function F determines the type of binary 
model. So the probability of observing a value of zero is:   
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 The set of parameters β reflects the impact of changes in x on the probability. For 
example, among the factors that might interest us is the marginal effect of family 
condition on the probability of obtaining a loan. The problem at this point is to devise a 
suitable model for the right-hand side of the equation. (Greene, Econometric 
Analysis,5th edition 2002) 
In our analysis we use the normal distribution giving rise to the probit model: 
 
 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
It is possible to derive a binary choice model from underlying behavioral assumptions. 
This leads to a latent variable representation of the model. For example, let us look at 
the decision of a married female to obtain a loan or not. The utility difference between 
obtaining a loan and not taking one depends upon the stated income but also on other 
personal characteristics, like the woman‟s age, other banking transactions that might 
have, etc. Thus, for each person i we can write the utility difference between granting a 
loan or not granting one as a function of observed characteristics,  and unobserved 
characteristics, . (Verbeek 2008) Assuming a linear additive relationship formula, we 
obtain for the utility difference, denoted , 
 
 
 
where  is the dependent variable, are the coefficients, are the regressors 
variables, are the error terms and  is the volume of the observations. 
The error terms  are normally distributed with mean zero and variance . 
So, the observed dependent variable is determined by whether  exceeds a threshold 
value: 
 
 
The responding variable takes value of 1 if the loan was granted which means that the 
application was accepted and the value of 0 if it was rejected. 
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At this point we have to report that we do not model how one decides the amount of 
credit one applies for. Furthermore we take for granted that the individuals, who 
eventually take the loan, receive the exact amount of credit they applied for. 
In the second model we want to find the probability of a loan to become “bad”, in other 
words the probability of default. So we use again a binary dependent variable  in this 
case to denote “good” or “bad” loan (probit model). We also indicate an unobservable 
variable with the subscript *: 
 
 
 
where  is the dependent variable, are the coefficients, are the regressors 
variables, are the error terms and  is the volume of the observations. 
 
 
 
The dependent variable  takes the value 1if the loan is paid and 0 if loan is in delay. It 
is very important to mention that the distinction of a loan whether defaults or not is 
observed only if a loan is granted. For this reason, we have a censoring rule for  
and an observation rule too (Jacobson et al. 2003). 
 
Table 3.4.1 observation rule 
   
   
   
 
Thus we must now account for the sample selection rule. The problem that might arise 
in the model is that there are possibly factors which access the granting decision but do 
not appear clearly in the rule and these same factors affect the response in the default 
equation and then the default equation may produce biased predictions. Thus a predictor 
of default risk in a given population of applicants can be systematically biased because 
this given population is not made by a random sample. This population is constructed 
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only by the applications that were being accepted (Greene, Sample selection in credit-
scoring models 1998). 
Therefore an estimation of the two univariate models (simple model) produces a biased 
set of coefficient estimates and eventually a biased estimate of the default probability. 
For this reason we will appoint and estimate a model of the default probability that 
account for the sample selection effect. We will use a bivariate probit specification to 
model this (Greene, Sample selection in credit-scoring models 1998). This model 
consists of two simultaneous equations, as we described previously.  
 
     (Default equation) 
      (3.8)                                                                               
(Loan granting equation) 
                                    
 
Where: 
 
 
 
Selectivity: 
 
The vector of attributes,  are the factors used in approval decision. The probability of 
default given that a loan is accepted is: 
 
 
 
where Φ is the bivariate normal cumulative probability.  
The probability of not default given that a loan is accepted is: 
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If ρ is equal to zero then the selection is of no consequence and the univariate models 
are appropriate. 
Taking into account all the above, we conclude that the types of observations are three: 
no loans, defaulted loans (bad) and not defaulted loans (good). The likelihood function 
will take the following form: 
 
 
    
(3.11) 
 
The loglikelihood (see in Appendix A) is: 
 
 
 
 
where  and represent the univariate and bivariate standard normal c.d.f., 
the later with correlation coefficient ρ. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DICUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The total number of consumer loans applications from X bank was 14738. 8095 of these 
applications were accepted and 6643 were rejected. We should to mention that the data 
sample did not have any missing values. The sample is consisted of personal 
characteristics (gender, age, marital status, residence type, nationality and postal code), 
bank related characteristics (other loans, other banking transactions, loan duration, 
underwriter) and financial characteristics (annual income). The period of our research is 
from 2007 to 2009. 
 
Table 4.1.1 Total number of applications  
   obtaining a loan 
Total    rejected accepted 
date 2007 Count 1781 3809 5590 
% within date 31.9% 68.1% 100.0% 
2008 Count 2118 2461 4579 
% within date 46.3% 53.7% 100.0% 
2009 Count 2744 1825 4569 
% within date 60.1% 39.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 6643 8095 14738 
% within date 45.1% 54.9% 100.0% 
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Figure 4.1.1 Bar chart 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.2 Chi-square test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 811.099
a
 2 .000* 
Likelihood Ratio 821.339 2 .000* 
Linear-by-Linear Association 810.933 1 .000* 
N of Valid Cases 14738   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2059.43. 
* Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.1 reports the number of applications in total were in 2007, 2008 and 2009 
respectively. As we can see, the number of total applications slightly decreased and the 
number of consumer loans that were accepted decreased. More specifically almost 40% 
of the applicants obtained a loan in 2009 whereas the 68% in 2007. We observe the 
exact opposite results for the rejected loans. Figure 4.1.1 gives us a better look of the 
percentages of accepted and rejected loans together. 
 [33] 
 
This decrease of the loans might be explained by the trial of financial institutions to 
minimize the volume of the consumer loans due to global financial distress. In periods 
with such conditions there is financial uncertainty and liquidity shortage therefore banks 
want to protect their capitals. As it is obvious the difference is bigger in 2009 when the 
financial distress starts to affect our country intensively. People, in their effort to protect 
themselves as well, they control their consuming behavior but on the other hand their 
resource of liquidity, in periods like this, is from banks. This is the reason why we 
notice a minor decrease in the number of applications. 
 In order to ensure that the number of applications has to do with the period we did a 
chi-square test, to see if this relationship is statically significant, with null hypothesis 
that the two variables (date and loanstatus1) are independent under the condition that 
the expected observations in the crosstabulation matrix are at most 20% less than five. 
As we can see in table 4.1.2 in our case the respective percentage is 0%, the probability 
is .000<0.05 so we reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that the two variables are 
dependent one another.  
 
Figure 4.1.2 Loans given from Greek banks 
 
Source: Bank of Greece 
 
 
According to statistical data from bank of Greece we see in figure 4.1.2 the percentage 
change per year of consumer loans that are given by all Greek banks from 2007 to 2009. 
 [34] 
 
The green line represents the consumer loans. We notice a major decrease through these 
years which is compatible with the results of our data sample.  
 
Table 4.1.3 Total number of granted applications 
   defaulting a loan 
Total    bad loan good loan 
date 2007 Count 669 3140 3809 
% within date 17.6% 82.4% 100.0% 
2008 Count 465 1996 2461 
% within date 18.9% 81.1% 100.0% 
2009 Count 209 1616 1825 
% within date 11.5% 88.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 1343 6752 8095 
% within date 16.6% 83.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.4 Chi-squared test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 46.871
a
 2 .000* 
Likelihood Ratio 49.962 2 .000* 
Linear-by-Linear Association 24.031 1 .000* 
N of Valid Cases 8095   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 302.78. 
           * Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.3 indicates how many loans turn to be bad and how many loans turn to be 
good. The total number of loans that defaulted is 1343 which constitutes a default rate 
of 19.9% whereas the not defaulted loans are 6752. The total amount of good loans is 
larger than the total amount of bad loans. Taking into account that the financial 
institutions did not give so many consumer loans as before, we can infer that they might 
also take harder measures in the decision of providing a loan. This practice was 
followed as banks in financial distress try to minimize the default risk in order to avoid 
insolvency and illiquidity. 
 [35] 
 
Comparing the percentages of successful loans in 2007 and 2009, which are 82.4% and 
88.5% respectively, we result that as the crisis affects our country so the criteria to take 
a loan become more stringent and consequently that we have a better performance of 
loans.  
We also run a chi-squared test to see if there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the quality of loans (loanstatus2) and the time period (date) and as we can see 
in table 4.1.4, taking into account that 0 cells have excepted count less than 5, the 
probability is 0.00<0.05 so we reject the null hypothesis which is that the two variables 
are independent. Thus, the two variables are related to each other. 
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Table 4.1.5 gives details about descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables of the 
sample. The results are categorized by year in order to have a better view of the 
variables across the time. The age variable has a mean value 46.41 in 2007, 46.05 in 
2008 and 45.57 in 2009 which denotes that people around forty age apply for consumer 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.5 Descriptive statistics 
date age loan duration stated income 
2007 Mean 46.41 53.68 16063.67 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 46.08 53.03 13760.23 
Upper Bound 46.73 54.32 18367.11 
5% Trimmed Mean 46.19 53.68 12904.07 
Median 46.00 48.00 11565.00 
Variance 156.041 608.387 7.718E9 
Std. Deviation 12.492 24.666 87849.841 
Minimum 19 6 0 
Maximum 87 96 4661220 
2008 Mean 46.05 65.19 17464.68 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 45.69 64.36 15548.81 
Upper Bound 46.41 66.01 19380.54 
5% Trimmed Mean 45.90 66.33 13973.54 
Median 46.00 60.00 12176.00 
Variance 155.300 816.376 4.373E9 
Std. Deviation 12.462 28.572 66128.345 
Minimum 18 6 0 
Maximum 85 96 3839630 
2009 Mean 45.57 66.19 20188.71 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 45.21 65.37 16134.64 
Upper Bound 45.94 67.01 24242.79 
5% Trimmed Mean 45.45 67.41 15591.48 
Median 45.00 60.00 13780.00 
Variance 158.719 806.896 1.954E10 
Std. Deviation 12.598 28.406 139778.043 
Minimum 19 6 0 
Maximum 82 96 9107910 
    
 [37] 
 
loans. The standard deviation of the age is approximately 12 in every year which shows 
that the majority of people who applied for a consumer loan range from 30 to 50 years 
old. According to Boyle et al. (1992) and Thomas (2000), the older the customers the 
more risk averse they are and more impossible to fail to pay. Looking at the average of 
loan duration we observe an increase from year to year. More specifically the mean 
value is 53.68 in 2007, 65.19 in 2008 and 66.19 in 2009. This increase indicates that the 
applicants want a bigger period to pay back the loan as they seem to prefer long term 
loans. According to Roszbach (2004) and Jacobson et al. (2003) the long duration of a 
loan relates with an increase in probability of defaulting a loan. Moreover the average 
annual income is about 16.100 € in 2007, 17.500€ in 2008 and 20.200€ in 2009. At first 
glance, we see an increase in the income of the potential borrowers but looking at the 
standard deviations which are extremely high (87.850, 66.128 and 139.778 respectively) 
we conclude that the annual income varies widely among the sample mean. In other 
words there are applicants that have extremely high income (taking into account the 
maximum value) and others that have minor or no annual income (minimum value).  
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Table 4.1.6 Characteristic of applicants  
Variables Accept loan Reject loan Total 
Age 18-40 
       40-60 
      
2588 
4054 
1453 
2803 
3066 
774 
5391 
7120 
2227 
Loan duration  
                       
375 
7720 
138 
6505 
513 
14225 
Income € 
          € 
4923 
3172 
4389 
2254 
9312 
5426 
Oth.BankTr. Yes 
           No 
6447 
1638 
4457 
2186 
10904 
3834 
Nationality Greek 
         Other 
7923 
172 
6318 
325 
14241 
497 
Marital St. Married 
            Divorced 
            Single 
4959 
2311 
825 
3503 
2450 
690 
8462 
4761 
1515 
Oth.loans Yes 
                No 
1639 
6456 
0 
6643 
1639 
13099 
Postal code Big city 
               Other city 
4731 
3364 
3700 
2943 
8431 
6307 
Resid.type Tenant 
                 Owner        
1296 
6799 
1261 
5382 
2557 
12181 
Gender  Female 
         Male 
2984 
5111 
2490 
4153 
 
5474 
9264 
Underwriter Yes 
                   No 
854 
7241 
1039 
5604 
1893 
12845 
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Table 4.1.6 shows the characteristics of all the applicants. As we can see most of them 
are in the age group of 40-60 years old. This age group is also the most preferable for 
taking a consumer loan. Furthermore banks were more willing to provide loans with 
bigger length which indicates that banks want to create long-term relationships with 
customers. As far as income is concerned, we observe that the applicants with low 
income (≤15000€) are twice as much the applicants that have high annual income. We 
also notice that the majority of the applicants who are being accepted have already 
relationship with the bank (such as deposits, credit cards) and have Greek nationality. 
Finally the most applications are done by men who are the majority of the applicants 
obtaining a loan as well. 
The correlation matrix in Appendix B indicates that the variables that are positively 
correlated to the accepted loans are bank transactions, postal code, nationality loan 
duration and marital status by descending order whereas the variables that are 
negatively correlated are other loans, age, underwriter, income. For instance an 
applicant who has deposits in the X bank (other banking transactions) impacts positively 
in the decision of obtaining the consumer loan that applied for. We consider the 
correlation significant at the 0.01level (2-tailed). However it is very important to 
mention that the correlation coefficient does not control for other factors‟ effect and 
therefore we should conduct further examination to explore these relationships. 
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Table 4.1.7 Characteristics of borrowers 
Variables Good loan Bad loan Total 
Age 18-40 
       40-60 
      
2063 
3408 
1281 
525 
646 
172 
2588 
4054 
1453 
Loan duration  
                       
360 
6392 
15 
1328 
375 
7720 
Income € 
          € 
4040 
2712 
883 
460 
4923 
3172 
Oth.BankTr. Yes 
           No 
5457 
1295 
990 
353 
6447 
1648 
Nationality Greek 
         Other 
6618 
134 
1305 
38 
7923 
172 
Marital St. Married 
            Divorced 
            Single 
4175 
1881 
696 
784 
430 
129 
4959 
2311 
825 
Oth.loans Yes 
                No 
1184 
5568 
455 
888 
1639 
6456 
Postal code Big city 
               Other city 
3974 
2778 
757 
586 
4731 
3364 
Resid.type Tenant 
                 Owner        
1024 
5728 
272 
1071 
1296 
6799 
Gender   Female 
         Male 
2529 
4223 
455 
888 
 
2984 
5111 
Underwriter Yes 
                   No 
677 
6075 
177 
1166 
854 
7241 
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In the Table 4.1.7, we can see the performance of the accepted loans in good and bad 
loans. Moreover we can see how the characteristics of borrowers are classified into 
these two categories. Taking into account the age of the borrowers we notice that people 
in the group of 40-60 years old performed better as far as repayment is concerned 
(18.95% default rate). Surprisingly, the borrowers who apply for short-term loans 
fulfilled their obligations to a greater extent than those who take longer duration loans. 
The default rate of short term loans is 4.16% whereas the default rate of long terms 
loans is 20.8%. Furthermore, we look at the annual income of the borrowers and note 
that there is a slightly difference between the proportion of good loans whether they 
have high income or not. The married borrowers also have approximately the same 
default rate with single borrowers (18%) whereas the divorced of them have bigger 
default rate (about 23%). At last we observe that women failed in a smaller extent to 
repay their loan in comparison with men. 
Taking a look in the correlation matrix, in the Appendix B, we notice that the variables 
banking transactions, loan duration, other loans and marital status are positively 
correlated with the not default loan (loanstatus2) in 0.01 level of significance (2-tailed) 
though the income, age and underwriter are negatively correlated with the event of not 
default a consumer loan. We have to clarify again that there is a need of investigating 
the relationship of the factors in more depth in order to have a better and more correct 
view of their influence. 
 
4.2 Probability of Obtaining a Loan through years 2007-2009 
 
Does the probability of granting a loan change through years? In this section our goal is 
to examine the answer of this question. Firstly we separate the full data sample by year 
into three subsamples. The first subsample is consisted of all applications having been 
made in 2007, the second one respectively refers to applications having been made in 
2008 and the third one to those made in 2009. It is important to have a sight of how the 
variables affect the probability of obtaining a loan in each period taking for granting that 
in periods of financial distress the financial decisions change. Thus it is worthwhile to 
have a view of how the financial institutions handle the critical decision of giving 
consumer loans and if something in their strategy changes through these years.  
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Table 4.2.1 Binary probit model 2007 
  
   Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)  
Sample: 1 5590 
   
 
Included observations: 5590 
  
 
Convergence achieved after 31 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.    
      
     C 6.867453 5274.69 0.001302 0.999  
AGE1 -0.30056 0.06003 -5.0068 0.0000*  
AGE2 -0.19497 0.056829 -3.43074 0.0006*  
BANKTR 0.409294 0.038833 10.53971 0.0000*  
BIGCITY 0.062392 0.037958 1.643707 0.1002  
MARRIED 0.152368 0.039908 3.818014 0.0001*  
MALE -0.01069 0.039003 -0.27404 0.7841  
HIGHINCO 0.022557 0.042082 0.536019 0.5919  
LOANDUR2 -0.54957 0.097511 -5.63598 0.0000*  
NATIONG 0.496486 0.099606 4.98449 0.0000*  
OTHERLOA -6.81984 5274.69 -0.00129 0.999  
OWNER 0.101358 0.049721 2.038511 0.0415*  
UNDERWR 0.128946 0.055372 2.328707 0.0199*  
     
 
Mean dependent var 0.681395    S.D. dependent var 0.465977  
S.E. of regression 0.440627     Akaike info criterion 1.120952  
Sum squared resid 1082.787     Schwarz criterion 1.136367  
Log likelihood -3120.06     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.126324  
Restr. log likelihood -3498.3     Avg. log likelihood -0.55815  
LR statistic (12 df) 756.472     McFadden R-squared 0.10812  
Probability(LR stat) 0 
   
 
     
 
Obs with Dep=0 1781      Total obs 5590  
Obs with Dep=1 3809 
   
     
     * Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.2.1 provides us with the results of the first regression. We run the probit 
regression model for the year 2007. The subsample consists of 5590 observations which 
are all the applications submitted this year. The results were ready after 31 iterations 
that were required for convergence and the second derivatives method which was used 
in order to compute the coefficient covariance matrix. The McFadden R-squared, which 
is the likelihood ratio index, equals to 0.10812, the probability (LR stat.) is zero with 12 
degrees of freedom. The number that indicates the degrees of freedom actually is the 
number of restrictions under the test. 
In general, the probit model assumes that the higher the value of “probit” the greater the 
probability to obtain a loan. Thus the positive coefficient values imply increase in the 
probability of obtaining a consumer loan relative to the applicants‟ characteristics and 
the negative coefficient values imply decrease in the probability correspondingly. 
 [43] 
 
Looking at the table 4.2.1 we observe that eight out of twelve influencing factors are 
statistically significant at significant level 5%. The regressors variables: age1, age2, 
bank transactions, married, loan duration2, nationality, owner and underwriter are 
statistically significant factors because their probability is less than p=0.05. More 
specifically, for the variable age1 we reject the null hypothesis that its coefficient is 
equal to zero and we deduce that it is statistically significantly different than zero with 
value -0.30056. For the age2 we also reject the null hypothesis and we accept that its 
coefficient is equal to -0.19497. Similarly for the variable loan duration2 the value of 
the coefficient is equal to -0.54957, for the bank transactions is 0.409292, for the 
married is 0.152360, for the owner is 0.496486, for the nationality is 0.101358 and for 
the underwriter is 0.128946. As we can see the variables age1, age2 and loan duration2 
negatively impact the probability of obtaining a loan whereas the variables bank 
transactions, married, owner, nationality, and underwriter impact positively.  
For example a person who applies for a consumer loan at the age group of 18-40 or 40-
60 is less likely to obtain a loan particularly if one is in the first group. This is because 
the older the applicant might be the more steady income might have and more 
responsible might be with his/her financial obligations. Similarly, the bigger the length 
of a loan in demand the less the probability to obtain the loan.  
On the other hand if the applicant has other relationships with the bank (such as 
deposits, credit cards) he/she has higher probability to obtain a loan. This indicates that 
financial institutions prefer to provide loans to their customers. If the potential borrower 
is married, it is more likely to take a loan as the marriage clarifies a responsible person 
who can commit to someone. Moreover, being Greek the applicant is more possibly to 
obtain a loan. Banks are less hesitant to provide a loan to a person who has Greek 
nationality as it may seem a safer choice due to the obvious commitment with Greece 
and especially the city of his/her residence. An applicant that has a house on his/her 
ownership indicates that he/she has financial wealth. Finally it seems, although it was 
unexpectable, that if a potential borrower does not have an underwriter (underwr=no 
underwriter, wunderwr=with underwriter) he/she has higher probability to obtain a loan. 
However the other four variables (high income, male, big city and other loans) are 
statistically insignificant in explaining the banks‟ lending decision in this study. 
 
 
 
 [44] 
 
Table 4.2.2 Binary probit 2008 
  
   Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 4579 
   Included observations: 4579 
  Convergence achieved after 32 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 6.936279 5854.587 0.001185 0.9991 
AGE1 -0.28814 0.065357 -4.40872 0.0000* 
AGE2 -0.21215 0.060935 -3.48154 0.0005* 
BANKTR 0.465578 0.047233 9.856997 0.0000* 
BIGCITY 0.021734 0.041036 0.529632 0.5964 
MARRIED 0.094136 0.04345 2.166561 0.0303* 
MALE 0.034917 0.042251 0.826429 0.4086 
HIGHINCO 0.109528 0.044376 2.468156 0.0136* 
LOANDUR2 -0.63648 0.121257 -5.24904 0.0000* 
NATIONG 0.280234 0.108397 2.585254 0.0097* 
OTHERLOA -7.18296 5854.587 -0.00123 0.999 
OWNER 0.101623 0.054045 1.880349 0.0601 
UNDERWR 0.219128 0.06063 3.614177 0.0003* 
     
     Mean dependent var 0.537454     S.D. dependent var 0.49865 
S.E. of regression 0.456667     Akaike info criterion 1.177801 
Sum squared resid 952.2135     Schwarz criterion 1.196054 
Log likelihood -2683.58     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.184227 
Restr. log likelihood -3161.06     Avg. log likelihood -0.58606 
LR statistic (12 df) 954.9729     McFadden R-squared 0.151053 
Probability(LR stat) 0 
   
     Obs with Dep=0 2118      Total obs 4579 
 
2461 
   * Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.2 shows the results of the probit model for the time period 2008. The volume 
of this subsample is 4579. The results were ready after 32iterations that were required 
for convergence and the second derivatives method which was used in order to compute 
the coefficient covariance matrix. The McFadden R-squared equals to 0.151053, the 
probability (LR stat.) is zero with 12 degrees of freedom. The number that indicates the 
degrees of freedom is the number of restrictions under the test. 
We notice that eight out of twelve influencing factors are statistically significant at 
significant level 5%.  The regressors variables: age1, age2, bank transactions, married, 
highincome, loan duration2, nationality and underwriter are statistically significant 
 [45] 
 
factors because their probability is less than p=0.05. More specifically, for the variable 
age1 we reject the null hypothesis that its coefficient is equal to zero and we deduce that 
it is statistically significantly different than zero with value -0.28814. For the age2 we 
also reject the null hypothesis and we accept that its coefficient is equal to -0.21215. 
Similarly for the variable loan duration2 the value of the coefficient is equal to -
0.63648, for the bank transactions is 0.465578, for the married is 0.094136, for the high 
income is 0.109528, for the nationality is 0.280234 and for the underwriter is 
0.219128.The variables age1, age2 and loan duration2 negatively impact the probability 
of obtaining a loan whereas the variables bank transactions, married, high income, 
nationality, underwriter impact positively.  
The characteristic in the subsample of year 2008 that is also statistically significant in 
the banking decision to give a consumer loan is the high income. High income indicates 
financial wealth and therefore it constitutes an important criterion for the lending 
decision. On the other hand, in 2008 if a respondent has a home to his/her ownership it 
is statistically insignificant with probability 0.0601>0.05.  
 [46] 
 
    
     Table 4.2.3 Binary probit 2009 
   
  
 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Sample: 1 4569 
   
 
Included observations: 4569 
  
 
Convergence achieved after 35 iterations 
 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
 
 
     
    
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
 
 
     
    
 
C 7.098828 6592.015 0.001077 0.9991 
 
AGE1 -0.35814 0.064927 -5.51598 0.0000* 
 
AGE2 -0.21262 0.061567 -3.45353 0.0006* 
 
BANKTR 0.470358 0.054833 8.578065 0.0000* 
 
BIGCITY 0.048336 0.04288 1.127252 0.2596 
 
MARRIED 0.067979 0.046705 1.455498 0.1455 
 
MALE -0.06215 0.044445 -1.39846 0.162 
 
HIGHINCO 0.099868 0.044345 2.25206 0.0243* 
 
LOANDUR2 -0.52528 0.12042 -4.36211 0.0000* 
 
NATIONG 0.200511 0.139229 1.44015 0.1498 
 
OTHERLOA -7.7112 6592.015 -0.00117 0.9991 
 
OWNER 0.082959 0.062168 1.334422 0.1821 
 
UNDERWR 0.199268 0.065448 3.044648 0.0023* 
 
 
    
 
Mean dependent var 0.399431     S.D. dependent var 0.489835 
 
S.E. of regression 0.428586     Akaike info criterion 1.069384 
 
Sum squared resid 836.6899     Schwarz criterion 1.089077 
 
Log likelihood -2429.01     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.076318 
 
Restr. log likelihood -3073.93     Avg. log likelihood -0.53163 
 
LR statistic (12 df) 1289.852     McFadden R-squared 0.209805 
 
Probability(LR stat) 0 
   
 
 
    
 
Obs with Dep=0 2744      Total obs 4569 
Obs with Dep=1 1825 
     * Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Finally, in table 4.2.3 we see the results of the third regression, having run the probit 
regression model for the year 2009. The subsample consists of 4569 observations. The 
results were ready after 35 iterations that were required for convergence and the second 
derivatives method which was used in order to compute the coefficient covariance 
matrix. The McFadden R-squared, which is the likelihood ratio index, equals to 
 [47] 
 
0.2098005, the probability (LR stat.) is zero with 12 degrees of freedom. The number 
that indicates the degrees of freedom is the number of restrictions under the test. 
The table 4.2.3 shows that in the period of 2009 only six out of twelve influencing 
factors are statistically significant at significant level 5%.  The regressors variables: 
age1, age2, bank transactions, highincome, loan duration2 and underwriter are 
statistically significant factors having probability which is less than p=0.05. More 
specifically, for the variable age1 we reject the null hypothesis that its coefficient is 
equal to zero and we deduce that it is statistically significantly different than zero with 
value -0.35214. For the age2 we also reject the null hypothesis and we accept that its 
coefficient is equal to -0.21262. Similarly for the variable loan duration is the value of 
the coefficient is equal to - 0.52528, for the high income is 0.099868, for the bank 
transactions is 0.470358 and for the underwriter is 0.199268.The variables age1, age2 
and loan duration2 negatively impact the probability of obtaining a loan whereas the 
variables bank transactions, high income, underwriter impact positively.   
We observe that the characteristics, having been statistically significant in the lending 
decision in the two previous years, Greek nationality and ownership of a house are now 
statistically insignificant in the model. Hence for the provision of a consumer loan in the 
period 2009, there were very specific and less characteristics that influence the banks‟ 
decision. 
Taking into consideration all the above results we conclude that the criteria for taking a 
consumer loan actually changed through time. It is obvious that as the financial 
conditions became more difficult, the factors that influence the lending decision were 
related to the financial wealth of the respondent. For instance we observe that the 
income of an applicant in 2007 was not a statistically significant factor and so it did not 
influence the probability of granting a loan. However, in 2008 as well as in 2009 the 
income was one of the factors that were statistically significant. On the other hand, 
applicants‟ characteristics, such as their nationality or marriage or even ownership of 
house, were statistically significant factors in 2007 but as the financial conditions were 
worsening these characteristics did not influence the banking lending decision. 
Furthermore, we notice that the important factors in the decision of providing a loan 
were becoming less in number, as the financial institutions started to focus in specific 
characteristics of the potential borrowers.   
All these indicate that the banks, in order to ensure themselves about the solvency of the 
applicant in periods with liquidity shortage (minimize the default risk), attended strictly 
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to characteristics with financial implication. In addition they wanted to keep their 
clientele therefore they financed their customers more easily and they preferred to 
provide liquidity for a short period of time as well. 
 
4.3 Probability of obtaining a loan and probability of default 
 
In this section we will try to examine the effects of the borrower‟s characteristics in the 
decision of granting consumer loans and their performance for the period 2007-2009. 
We used a bivariate probit model in order to see if the financial institutions‟ lending 
policies are compatible with default risk minimization or not and compare our results 
with the inferences of other studies with the same researching view. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Bivariate probit MLE of   and  
 
Variables 
 
                P(obtain a loan)         P( good loan) 
 St. error t-stat.  St. error t-stat. 
INERCEPT    6.026333         0.041500      145.21           0.568598         0.037133       15.31 
FEMALE  -0.001170           0.023437          -0.05      
 
  0.032492          0.008661         3.75* 
MARRIED  0.131105          0.025314        5.18*     0.008812          0.009626         0.92 
DIVORCED -0.015739                0.049115 -0.32 -0.022695         0.018429       -1.23 
AGE1  -0.309629            0.035658           -8.68*     -0.093693         0.012889       -7.27* 
AGE2 -0.189582            0.031583       -5.68 *     -0.046414         0.011405       -4.07* 
BIGCITY  0.054674            0.022675        2.41* 0.019125         0.008425 2.27* 
LOWINCOM  0.008756           0.024239        0.36 -0.028119         0.008811       -3.19* 
OWNER  0.067367           0.030681        2.20* 0.048710         0.011434        4.26* 
BANKTR   0.320849          0.025169          12.75* 0.080432         0.010619        7.57* 
LOANDUR1    0.593931         0.062037        9.57*  0.138305         0.020415        6.77 * 
NATIONG    0.335610         0.063765         5.26*  0.044858                0.029266 1.53   
UNDERWR    0.190437         0.033598         5.67*  0.039761         0.013802        2.88* 
OTHERL   -6.747611            0.041500       -162.59 *        0.072687          0.016892        4.30* 
Sigma                 0.369589         0.003729       99.11 
Rho ρ     0.259840         0.045344        5.73* 
*Significance level 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Table 4.3.1 shows the parameters, the standard errors and the t-statistics for the 
probability of obtaining a loan and the probability of a good loan (not defaulted). The 
critical values are 1.645, 1.96 and 2.575 for the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels 
and the sample has no missing values. The number of observations is 14738, the 
number of endogenous variables is 2 and the number of iterations is 53 in order the 
algorithm to converge. 
The statistically significant variables, at significance level 5%, for the probability of 
obtaining a loan are bank transactions, loan duration1, age1, age2, underwriter, Greek 
nationality, married, big city, owner and other loans with t-statistics equal to 12.75, 
9.57, -8.68, -5.68, 5.67, 5.26, 5.18, 2.41, 2.20 and -162.59 respectively. The variables, 
female, divorced and low income, are statistically insignificant in the probability of 
obtaining a loan in this study. 
The most important factors in the probability of obtaining a loan are the variables loan 
duration1, nationality Greek and bank transactions participate to the model with 
coefficients 0.593931, 0.33561 and 0.320849 respectively. These variables affect 
positively the banks‟ lending decision. As we notice the banks support their clientele 
since it is very important to remain competitive in the fierce banking industry. Another 
reason is that they have a more detailed view of the financial conditions and behaviors 
of customers who had previously transactions with them. Furthermore, it seems that 
short term loans are more attractive to banks‟ decision, as the short terms loans ensure a 
faster repayment of the loan, which favors the increase of liquidity and in a matter, 
ensures their capital during a difficult financial period. Also a Greek citizen appears a 
preferable choice by the financial institutions due to the obvious commitment with 
Greece and especially the city of his/her residence. The absence of bonds with a country 
for a foreigner may constitute a negative factor in the decision of being granted a loan as 
it is widely known that in many cases foreigners abandon the country where they had 
temporarily lived, leaving behind their debts.  
The variables with significantly smaller probability of being granted a loan are 
underwriter, married, owner, big city, other loans, age1 and age2 participate to the 
model with coefficients 0.190437, 0.131105, 0.067367, 0.054674,-6.747611, -0.309629 
and -0.189582 respectively. Consequently, if the applicant is married he/she has higher 
probability to obtain a loan as it is considered to be more responsible to his/her financial 
obligations. Furthermore, if the applicant has a house of his/her own, he/she has better 
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chance to take a loan. A way to interpret this sign of the parameter would be that people 
who have not monthly financial obligations, like paying a rent for their house, are more 
responsible and able to pay their loan back and also it seems to have financial wealth. 
People who live in one of the two big cities of Greece (Athens and Thessaloniki) 
attributed positively the banks‟ lending decision as they might have bigger income in 
comparison with people who live in other cities of the country. Surprisingly, if an 
applicant has no underwriter, to ensure that he/she pays back the loan in case of 
applicant‟s default to pay, seems to have more possibilities to obtain a consumer loan. 
Rather than reasoning we also observe that not having other loans to pay worsens 
applicants‟ chances to obtain a loan. Finally, the results show that the younger the 
applicant the smaller the chance to obtain a loan. As we expected this factor affects 
negatively the probability of granting a loan since the majority of young people usually 
does not have stable job or steady income. 
As far as the decision of a loan to be good (not defaulted) is concerned, the seventh 
column of the table 4.3.1 indicates that the statistically significant variables, at 
significance level 5%, are the female, age1, age2, big city, low income, owner, bank 
transactions, loan duration1, underwriter and with no other loans with t-statistics equal 
to 3.75, -7.27, -4.07, 2.27, -3.19, 4.26, 7.57, 6.77, 2.88 and 4.30 respectively.  
The variables that affect the most the probability of a good loan are loan duration1 and 
other loans participate to the model with coefficients 0.138305 and 0.072687 
respectively. The other variables that affect positively the event of a good loan are 
owner, female, big city, underwriter and bank transactions with coefficients, 0.011434, 
0.032492, 0.019125, 0.039761 and 0.010619  respectively, whereas the variables age1, 
age2 and low income and affect negatively the event of a good loan participate to the 
model with coefficients -0.093693, -0.046414 and -0.028119 respectively. 
As we can see, the short term loans constitute a positive weight in the probability of not 
defaulting. This can be explained by the fact that a short term can be paid back more 
rapidly. More specifically it is less possible expeditious changes to occur in a short 
period of time and especially during a financial distress where changes‟ frequency 
levels up. According to the results the borrowers that were already customers to a bank, 
having other bank transactions (such as deposit, credit cards) seem to have better 
performance. As we expected the factors owner and big city influence positively the 
probability of not defaulting as these characteristics are related to a financial wealth and 
responsible individual. Similar arguments could be applied to female borrowers. 
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Furthermore, the existence of an underwriter creates the insurance and in some cases the 
illusion that the borrower is capable of repaying his/her loan whereas in fact it is 
possible only to comprise the condition demanded to be granted it. For this reason the 
absence of an underwriter seems to give a better view about the financial reliability of 
the borrower which is compatible with our study‟s results. Finally, a borrower with no 
other financial obligations to pay (no other loans) has higher probability to meet his/her 
debts which is verified in our case. 
The most important factor, from the statistically significant negative ones, is that the 
younger borrowers seem to have smaller chances to repay their loans probably due to 
their unsteady income or their compulsive behavior. Furthermore and not at all 
surprisingly borrowers with low annual income (lower than 15000€) tend to have 
difficulties to pay their loans which is consistent with common sense especially in 
period with financial distress. 
The last parameter that we have to review is the correlation coefficient. The correlation 
coefficient is statistically significant with t-statistic equals to 5.73. Thus the selection 
bias is a big problem in the estimation of probability of default which verifies our 
choice to use the bivariate model in this study. The value of the correlation coefficient is 
0.259840 that is to say the loan granting equation is positively correlated with the 
defaulting equation. In particular this suggests that unexplained tendencies to extend 
credit are actually associated with higher frequencies of not default in our sample 
(Boyes 1989). 
 Taking all these into account we notice that there exist some differences in the 
statistically significant factors between the banks‟ decision to provide a loan and the 
event of not defaulting a loan. More specifically the variables married and nationg were 
important in the first equation whereas they were not significant in the default equation. 
Moreover, although the variables; female and low income were not important in the 
granting equation, they were in the second one. This witnesses some inefficient use of 
information in the evaluation of applicants.  
On the other hand we notice that all the statistically significant variables in both 
equations have the same sign that is the variables that increase (decrease) the probability 
of obtaining a loan also increase (decrease) the probability of a good loan. This leads us 
to infer that the financial institutions‟ lending policies are actually compatible with 
default risk minimization. A lending policy that attempts to seek out accounts, that they 
have low default probabilities, and has as overall motive the profit maximization. An 
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exception is comprised the variable other loans which has different sign in the two 
equations. This could be explained by the significantly large observations in our data 
sample of applicants with no other loans and therefore we will not take it into 
consideration. 
In a period of financial distress the major concern of financial institutions is to reduce 
their credit exposure which signifies reduction of the number of loans granted. 
Evidently, this extraordinary policy of banks made the criteria to grant a loan to become 
much more strict and consistent in a way that the probability of default a loan to reduce. 
A lending policy that attempts to seek out accounts, that they have low default 
probabilities, and has as overall motive the profit maximization. This policy will keep 
the financial institutions solvent and able to offer liquidity in a period which is mainly 
characterized by liquidity shortage, financial uncertainty, fear reaction and consequently 
rapidly financial changes. 
Finally, we compare our results with the studies of Boyes‟ et al. (1989), Jacobson‟s et 
al. (2003) and Roszbach‟s (2004). We should point out that Boyes‟ et al. (1989) study 
contains a sample of 4632 applications that were processed between 1977 and 1980, and 
Jacobson‟s et al. (2003) and Roszbach‟s (2004) studies contain 13338 applications that 
were processed between September 1994 and August 1995. Comparing our results with 
these studies we observe that our research based on the data sample of a Greek bank 
does not confirm the conclusions in Boyes‟ et al. (1989), Jacobson‟s et al. (2003) and 
Roszbach‟s (2004) studies that banks do not appear to be minimizing default risk. On 
the contrary our results verify that banks follow a policy of default risk minimization. 
Subsequently, our research does not confirm that non-systematic tendencies to grant 
loans are associated with greater default risk either, as the correlation coefficient in our 
model is equal to 0.259840. Secondly, we found that some variables that are statistically 
significant in only one equation which testifies some inefficient use of information in 
the evaluation of applicants and is a fact as well in  Boyes‟ et al. (1989), Jacobson‟s et 
al. (2003) and Roszbach‟s (2004) studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
Consumer credit constitutes a significant instrument in the financial planning of 
households and simultaneously is among the most profitable investments in lenders' 
asset portfolios. Despite the wide variety of banking services, lending to the public 
constitutes the core of the income of banks and other lending institutions.  However, 
increases in the amount of loans also causes increases in the number of defaulted loans. 
Therefore, the primary problem of any lender is to differentiate between “low risk” and 
“high risk” debtors prior to granting credit. The main method used in assessing credit 
risks is the credit scoring analysis, which consists of the valuation of the financial 
history and financial statements of the applicant credit background.  The aim of credit 
analysis is to evaluate the borrower‟s probability of repayment, to determine the 
financial strength of the borrower, and to minimize the risk of non-payment to a cut off 
level. Credit scoring, which is broadly applied in consumer lending, is a statistical 
approach to predicting the probability that a credit applicant will default or become 
delinquent. Credit scoring system is a computerized process producing a score 
according to various relevant quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the borrower 
to assess loan applications. The overall idea of credit scoring is based on the statistical 
probabilities, or in other words the combinations of the borrowers‟ characteristics 
differentiating good from bad. In such way a score is generated in order to act as an 
estimate of the risk level of each new loan when the banks‟ officers have decided 
whether to accept  the loans or not. 
In this study we developed an optimal specification of the credit scoring model, and we 
focused on an analysis of the determinants of obtaining a consumer loan as well as the 
probability of a loan to default in Greece for the period 2007-2009. The onset of the 
recent financial crisis that erupted in September, 2008 caused an extraordinary reduction 
of business and consumer loans, mortgages and securitized products. Nevertheless, the 
financial results of the crisis in the Greek Banking sector became observable at the end 
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of 2009. After a variety of government actions to promote the liquidity and solvency of 
the financial sector, almost every bank in Greece reacted concurrently similarly by 
decreasing dramatically the amount of loans granted. Obviously, this policy of all banks 
entailed that henceforth the criteria to grant a loan would be much more strict and 
consistent. Therefore it was worthwhile and interesting to see what was happening in 
the special case of Greek banking system during the latest global financial distress. 
 
5.2 Results of research 
 
Initially we examined, in our research if the probability of granting a consumer loan 
changes through years. Having in mind that during a period of financial distress the 
financial decisions change rapidly, we considered the analysis of the variables‟ affection 
in the probability of granting a loan per year very interesting. Separating the full data 
sample into three different time periods (2007, 2008, 2009), we performed a probit 
model for each sub-sample and indeed the empirical results suggest that the probability 
of obtaining a loan does change through time.  
Our results indicate that during the different lending period, there are different numbers 
of variables which impact banks‟ decision to grant a consumer loan. More specifically 
as the financial conditions were becoming more difficult, the factors that influence the 
lending decision were related to the financial wealth of the respondent. For instance, the 
annual income of an applicant in 2007 was not a statistically significant factor and so it 
did not influence the probability of granting a loan whereas in 2008 the income was one 
of the factors that were statistically significant and in 2009 as well. Then again some 
factors such as nationality were statistically significant but as the financial conditions 
were worsening stopped to influence the probability of granting a loan, Furthermore, the 
important factors in the decision of providing a loan were becoming less in number, as 
the financial institutions started to focus in specific characteristics of the potential 
borrowers. 
All these indicate that the banks, in order to ensure themselves about the solvency of the 
applicant in periods with liquidity shortage (minimize the default risk), attended strictly 
to characteristics with financial implication. In addition they wanted to keep their 
clientele therefore they financed their customers more easily and they preferred to 
provide liquidity for a short period of time too. Consequently the results show that it is 
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important to review the borrowers‟ creditworthiness periodically, as the changes in 
economic condition could affect the criteria on lending policy, which is congruent with 
McAllister‟s et al. (1994) findings. 
Afterwards we examined the effects of the borrower‟s characteristics in the decision of 
granting consumer loans and their performance for the period 2007-2009. We used a 
bivariate probit model in order to see if the financial institutions‟ lending policies are 
compatible with default risk minimization or not and compare our results with the 
inferences of other studies with the same researching view. 
 The results in this research show that there exist some differences in the statistically 
significant factors between the banks‟ decision to provide a loan and the event of a good 
loan. More specifically, although the variables, married and nationg, were important in 
the obtaining equation they were not in the default equation. Although the variables, 
female and low income, were not important in the granting equation they were in the 
second one. This testifies some inadequate use of information in the evaluation of 
applicants which is a fact as well in Boyes‟ et al. (1989), Jacobson‟s et al, (2003) and 
Roszbach‟s (2004) studies. 
Furthermore according to the results, the variables that increase (decrease) the 
probability of obtaining a loan also increase (decrease) the probability of a good loan, 
which indicate that the financial institutions‟ lending policies are actually compatible 
with default risk minimization. This policy will keep the financial institutions solvent 
and able to offer liquidity in a period which is mainly characterized by liquidity 
shortage and financial uncertainty, therefore banks tend to follow it. Evidently the 
results of our research does not confirm the conclusions in Boyes‟ et al. (1989), 
Jacobson‟s et al. (2003) and Roszbach‟s (2004) studies that banks do not appear to be 
minimizing default risk.  
 
5.3 Limitations of research 
 
It is important to mention that there are some limitations in our research which are 
related to the data set, the estimation techniques and the variables we used. To begin 
with, we only used the data set from one commercial bank of Greece. The results of our 
research have limited implications and robustness and thus do not depict the lending 
behavior of all commercial banks in the consumer lending in Greece. 
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Furthermore we did not use in this research data information about the amount of 
consumer loans therefore we cannot make inferences about the influence of loan size to 
the banks‟ lending decision and to default risk. As a result, even if banks are risk averse, 
we cannot examine their relation between risk minimization and profit maximization.  
As far as model is concerned, the potential exposure to future risk is not taking into 
account as the credit scoring is usually a static model in nature. Also the model does not 
account for the time to delinquency or default therefore it might, for instance, lose its 
predictive power during a recession if the characteristics entered into the model or the 
underlying customer population is sensitive to the economic cycle.  
In addition, we should point out that there are observations (such as other loans) with 
very small variation, resulting to an extremely high coefficient, which cannot be 
explained by logical inferences.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
We could improve the research results and generalize the research findings, by using a 
larger and more extensive data from other commercial banks. Furthermore there are a 
number of characteristics that can be added to the models in order to enrich the models‟ 
performance. For instance we could include variables such as occupation of applicants 
or even better educational level of applicants, changes in applicants‟ annual income, the 
amount of credit and the time that a borrower defaults to pay.  
It has been suggested that bigger loans are more preferable because they offer higher 
expected earnings (Jacobson et al. 2003) thus it is very important to examine whether 
the lending policy is compatible with profit maximization or not. Having in mind our 
findings, that banks‟ lending policy is compatible with default risk minimization, it will 
be very interesting to further investigate if it is compatible to profit maximization as 
well. If it is the case, we could also examine the relation between risk minimization and 
profit maximization. Moreover from a profit or utility maximizing perspective, it is not 
only important to know if but also when a loan will default. Traditional credit scoring 
models predict default risk and therefore fail to take into account the multi-period nature 
of loans contracts so a survival analysis could allow a more realistic evaluation of the 
return on a loan (Roszbach 2004).  
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APPENDIX A 
Combining (3.5)-(4.7) and the independent variables, the likelihood function in equation 
(3.11) becomes: 
 
 
 
Substituting for (3.7), (A.1) implies the following loglikelihood function: 
 
 
 
Because of the symmetry property of the bivariate normal distribution, the last line in 
(A.2) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
Since 
 
 
The loglikelihood function can be written as: 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Correlations 
Statistics=Correlation Coefficient,Type=Spearman's rho 
 loan 
status1 income 
loan 
status2 gender age citizenship 
bank 
transactions marital status loan duration other loans postal code residence type underwriter 
loan status1 1.000 -.054** . .006 -.120** .076** .142** .080** .069** -.320** .028** .017* -.076
**
 
income -.054
**
 1.000 -.045** -.126** .155** -.098** -.075** -.091** -.002 .070** -.084** -.064** .184
**
 
loan status 2 . -.045** 1.000 -.028* -.079** .022* .066** .041** .075** .150** .019 -.008 -.038
**
 
gender .006 -.126** -.028* 1.000 .007 .001 -.009 -.012 .034** .011 -.061** -.053** -.075
**
 
age -.120
**
 .155** -.079** .007 1.000 -.077** -.067** -.349** -.013 .072** -.013 -.194** .070
**
 
nationality .076
**
 -.098** .022* .001 -.077** 1.000 .047** .030** -.030** -.046** -.019* -.172** -.063
**
 
bank transactions .142
**
 -.075** .066** -.009 -.067** .047** 1.000 .066** .013 -.087** -.010 .032** -.065
**
 
marital status .080
**
 -.091** .041** -.012 -.349** .030** .066** 1.000 -.007 -.040** -.050** .171** .018
*
 
loan duration .069
**
 -.002 .075** .034** -.013 -.030** .013 -.007 1.000 .045** .011 -.003 -.036
**
 
other loans -.320
**
 .070** .150** .011 .072** -.046** -.087** -.040** .045** 1.000 -.032** -.026** .042
**
 
postal code .028
**
 -.084** .019 -.061** -.013 -.019* -.010 -.050** .011 -.032** 1.000 .070** -.075
**
 
residence type .017
*
 -.064** -.008 -.053** -.194** -.172** .032** .171** -.003 -.026** .070** 1.000 -.028
**
 
underwriter -.076
**
 .184** -.038** -.075** .070** -.063** -.065** .018* -.036** .042** -.075** -.028** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
